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Comment
EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE BATERED WOMAN
SYNDROME IN MARYLAND
INTRODUCTION
The "battered woman syndrome"' is not a new defense. Nor is
it a legal justification or excuse for the killing of an abusive husband
or partner.2 Rather, the term "battered woman syndrome" refers to
a set of common characteristics unique to women who are physically
and/or psychologically abused by their mates.' In the last decade
this psychological profile has found its way into the nation's courts.4
This new interplay between psychology and the law has resulted
from the introduction of expert testimony on the syndrome by bat-
tered women on trial for killing their batterers, to aid their claims of
self-defense.5 The expert testimony is introduced to assist the trier
of fact in determining whether the defendant acted out of a reason-
able belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm.6
Once treated with hostility and skepticism, courts in a number
of states now support admissibility of expert testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome.7 The clear trend among courts today is to
1. Other sources use the term "battered wife syndrome" or "battered spouse syn-
drome." For consistency, "battered woman syndrome" will be used throughout.
2. As this Comment argues, it is relevant to the justification of self-defense.
3. See L. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN XiV-XV (1979).
4. The first case to admit expert testimony on the syndrome was Ibn-Tamas v.
United States, 407 A.2d 626, 630-31 (D.C. 1979), rev'd, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983).
Though the initial Ibn-Tamas decision later was reversed, it was quite influential in other
jurisdictions.
5. See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 707, 386 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1989) ("Evi-
dence of the [battered woman] syndrome is admissible in an attempt to show that the
defendant had a mental state necessary for the defense ofjustification although the ac-
tual threat of harm does not immediately precede the homicide.").
6. See, e.g., State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981) (expert testimony might
explain the defendant's perceptions and behavior at the time of the killing); State v.
Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 201-02, 478 A.2d 364, 375 (1984) (expert testimony on the syndrome
would bolster a defendant's testimony).
7. The following decisions have permitted expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome: People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1984); People v.
Hare, 782 P.2d 831 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 800 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1990); lbn-Tamas
v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) rev'd, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); Hawthorne
v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Chapman v. State, 258 Ga. 214, 367
S.E.2d 541 (1988); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); People v. Minnis,
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acknowledge that the testimony is highly probative and more help-
ful than confusing to the jury in deciding whether a battered wo-
man's conduct was consistent with her claim of self-defense.
Maryland courts, however, have thus far refused to admit evidence
on the syndrome.8 Although Maryland recently has enacted a new
law that permits courts to admit evidence on the syndrome,9 this
118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983); State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d
563 (1986), over'd on other grounds, State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. 639, 763 P.2d 572 (1988);
State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (1985); Commonwealth v. Rose, 725
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 838 (1989), over'd in part, Commonwealth v.
Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v.
Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989); State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989); State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Baker, 120 N.H.
773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980); State v. Kelly, 97 NJ. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v.
Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Torres, 128
Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1985); State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384, 366 S.E.2d
586 (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811
(N.D. 1983); State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990); State v. Moore,
72 Or. App. 454, 695 P.2d 985 (1985); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41, 555
A.2d 772 (1989); State v. Hill, 287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (1986); State v. Leaphart,
673 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984); State v. Wanrow,
88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977); State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va. 1987).
8. See Kriscumas v. State, No. 86-1072 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 9, 1987); Friend v.
State, No. 88-483 (Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 12, 1988).
9. The new law provides in pertinent part:
(B) Notwithstanding evidence that the defendant was the first aggressor, used
excessive force, or failed to retreat at the time of the alleged offense, when the
defendant raises the issue that the defendant was, at the time of the alleged
offense, suffering from the battered spouse syndrome as a result of the past
course of conduct of the individual who is the victim of the crime for which the
defendant has been charged, the court may admit for the purpose of explaining
the defendant's motive or state of mind, or both, at the time of the commission
of the alleged offense:
(1) Evidence of repeated physical and psychological abuse of the defend-
ant perpetrated by an individual who is the victim of a crime for which the
defendant has been charged; and
(2) Expert testimony on the battered spouse syndrome.
Act of May 14, 1991, ch. 337, 1191 Md. Laws 2275. Attempts to pass similar legislation
in previous years failed, but recent political developments and media attention brought
the issue to the forefront of Maryland politics in 1991. On February 20, 1991, Governor
William Donald Schaefer commuted the sentences of eight women imprisoned for as-
saulting or murdering their abusive husbands and boyfriends. See The Sun (Baltimore),
Feb. 20, 1991, at IA, col. 2. The circumstances of the commutation were a first for
Maryland, and followed a similar decision last December by former Ohio governor Rich-
ard Celeste to release 25 women inmates. Subsequent to the eight Maryland women's
release, the Baltimore Sun published an article that suggested the decision to commute
some of the women's sentences was made without all of the facts. Regardless of the
merits of the individual commutation decisions, the situation illustrates how the failure
of Maryland courts to allow testimony on the syndrome at trial has resulted in some
problematical convictions. Had testimony on the syndrome been presented to the juries
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Comment suggests that Maryland courts need not rely on the stat-
ute to admit such testimony. An examination of Maryland law gov-
erning admission of expert testimony reveals that there is no reason
why testimony on the syndrome should be excluded in cases involv-
ing battered women who claim self-defense for killing their batter-
ers, even absent the new statute.' °
Other jurisdictions have determined that the expert testimony
is necessary to insure that these women receive their constitutional
right to a fair trial." This Comment argues that Maryland courts
should apply the same reasoning and admit expert testimony on the
syndrome. Part I presents an overview of the battered woman syn-
drome, including an examination of the profile of battered women
who kill. Part II discusses using expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome to help support the battered woman's claim of
self-defense, and recentjudicial responses to the issue in otherjuris-
dictions. Part III examines relevant Maryland cases, and analyzes
the prospect of admitting the testimony under the rules governing
expert testimony. Part IV reviews legislation regarding admissibility
of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in other juris-
dictions, analyzes Maryland's recent legislation, and concludes that,
as written, the Maryland statute will undoubtedly help remedy some
of the unique problems battered women encounter in raising their
claims of self-defense.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME
A woman is battered every fifteen seconds in the United
States,' 2 and Maryland is not exempt from this insidious violence.
An estimated 150,000 Maryland women are battered each year, and
in 1990 approximately 50 were killed by their spouses or boy-
friends.' 3 Although domestic violence traditionally has been con-
sidered a private matter,' 4 sometimes the shocking consequences of
in these eight individual cases, Governor Schaefer's action might have been
unnecessary.
10. See infra notes 116-126 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41, 58, 555 A.2d 772, 781 (1989)
(the testimony is so important to a battered woman's claim of self-defense that defense
counsel was ineffective for his failure to introduce the testimony); State v. Anaya, 438
A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981) (testimony is central to the defendant's claim of self-defense).
12. Fact Sheet, Battered Spouse Syndrome Bill (H.B. 49, S.B. 141, 1991 Sess.) (sta-
tistical data available at the Public Justice Center, Baltimore, Maryland). A woman is
more likely to be injured from battering than from rape, auto accidents, and muggings
combined. Id.
13. Id.
14. The complex reasons for this largely are grounded in traditional values regard-
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this abuse force their way into the public eye. Spousal homicide is
one such public consequence.
Researchers have developed several theories to account for the
widespread phenomenon of physical, sexual, and psychological
abuse of women by men in intimate relationships that has come to
be known as the "battered woman syndrome."' 5 These psychologi-
cal theories help to explain, first, why battered women remain in
these relationships, and second, why, under certain circumstances,
these women have resorted to killing their batterers.' 6
A. Learned Helplessness Theory
The psychological theory known as "learned helplessness"
helps explain why the battered woman is not free to leave the situa-
tion.t7 The theory describes a psychological condition first tested in
a series of laboratory experiments in which dogs were taught that
their behavior did not affect whether they received electric shocks.'"
Instead of trying to escape, the dogs developed coping responses.' 9
ing marriage and the family. Some researchers suggest that domestic violence can be
understood only within the context of marriage itself. See Straus, Wife-Beating: Causes,
Treatment and Research Needs, in BATrERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 478-79 (U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, 1978). Historically, courts refrained from interference with a
husband's common law right to give his wife "moderate correction" as he would his
children or servants. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442, 444; see State v. Oliver, 70
N.C. 60 (1874).
15. The term "battered woman syndrome" specifically refers to a series of common
traits displayed by women subject to prolonged physical and mental abuse from their
husbands or partners. See L. WALKER, supra note 3. There are numerous books on the
battering phenomenon, and most researchers agree about the characteristics of individ-
uals in battering relationships. See, e.g., A. BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KILL
(1987); D. MARTIN, BATrERED WIVES (1976); L. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYN-
DROME (1984); WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE (E. Bochnak, ed.
1981). See generally N. ROSEN, BATrERED WIVES: A COMPREHENSIVE ANNOTATED BIBLIOG-
RAPHY OF ARTicLES, BOOKS AND STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1988).
16. The pioneering work in the field can be largely attributed to Dr. Lenore Walker
for applying the "learned helplessness" theory to battered women, and for developing
her "cycle theory of violence." See L. WALKER, supra note 2; L. WALKER, TERRIFYING
LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCIETY RESPONDS (1989) [hereinafter
TERRIFYING LOVE]. By 1989, Dr. Walker had testified as an expert in more than 150
cases involving battered women charged with killing their batterers. Id. at 7.
17. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 50-51.
18. See M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEATH 21-
27 (1975).
19. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 49-50. The dogs eventually
ceased all voluntary escape activity. Passive, the dogs remained in their own excrement.
Closer study revealed that they were not really "passive," but had developed coping
skills to minimize the pain. Their fecal matter helped insulate them from the electrical
impulses. The animals had to be repeatedly dragged from their cages before they
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Similar results were found in studies involving people. 0 When this
theory is applied to battered women, it does not mean that they
"learn" how to be helpless. Rather, it means that battered women
quickly learn that they cannot safely predict their behavior's effect
on their batterers. 21 They perceive that escape is impossible, and
concentrate on learning to cope with their situations.22
B. The Cycle Theory of Violence
Lenore Walker's "cycle theory of violence" explains the victimi-
zation process leading to the battered woman's development of
learned helplessness behavior.2 3 Within relationships involving bat-
tering behavior, three "cycles" of battering can be identified. 4
Phase one of the cycle, the "tension-building stage," involves
incidents of "minor" physical and mental abuse.25 During this
stage, the woman often tries to cope by responding with kindness or
merely by staying out of the batterer's way. 26 Because the woman is
apparently passive, the batterer is not forced to control his behavior,
stopped their "learned helplessness" behavior. Learned helplessness is the act of
choosing predictable coping strategies over unpredictable escape responses. Id.
20. M. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 30. The distortions in human subjects' percep-
tions caused significant changes in their motivation, thinking, and behavior. Id. at 49-56.
21. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 50-51. Because battered women
cannot predict their own safety, they do not believe that anyone else will be able to help
them. They limit their behavior to responses they know are possible and safe to make.
Id.
22. Id. Walker lists seven factors that occur in adulthood during the battering rela-
tionship itself that are associated with development of learned helplessness.
(1) A pattern of violence, particularly the occurrence of the Cycle of Vio-
lence .... An observable escalation in frequency and severity of the abuse....
(2) Sexual abuse of the woman.
(3) Jealousy, overpossessiveness, intrusiveness of the batterer, and isola-
tion of the woman.
(4) Threats to hurt or kill the woman.
(5) Psychological torture [defined as including verbal degradation, denial
of powers, isolation, monopolizing perceptions, occasional indulgences, hyp-
nosis, threats to kill, induced debility, drugs or alcohol].
(6) Violence correlates (including the woman knowing about the man's
violence against others, including children, animals, pets, or inanimate ob-
jects).
(7) Alcohol or drug abuse by the man or woman.
Id. at 52.
23. See L. WALKER, supra note 2, at 55-70; L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note
16, at 42-47.
24. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 42.
25. Id. "Minor" incidents include slaps, pinches, and verbal and psychological
abuse. Id.
26. Id. The woman's primary concern at this stage is to prevent the violence from
escalating. Id. at 43.
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and his abusiveness often is reinforced.27
The second phase of the cycle is the "acute battering incident,"
and is "characterized by the uncontrollable discharge of the ten-
sions that have built up during phase one."' 28 Phase two incidents
last two to twenty-four hours, and are more serious and marked by
increased destructiveness.29 Most women realize that the batterer's
violence is uncontrollable, and that therefore, he will not listen to
reason.30 Thus, many women report that they try to protect them-
selves by not resisting, choosing instead to "wait out the storm."'"
In the last phase of the battering cycle, "kindness and contrite
loving behavior," batterers often promise that the violence will
never happen again.3 2 Relieved that the violence has temporarily
ceased, "[i]t is in this phase of loving contrition, [the experts be-
lieve,] that the battered woman is most thoroughly victimized psy-
chologically." '  Ultimately, the psychological abuse escalates, and
the physical abuse recommences.
C. A Profile of Battered Women Who Kill
The "typical" battered woman is not an uneducated woman liv-
27. Id. Walker notes that the battered woman's desire to keep the batterer's violence
from growing proves to be a "double-edged sword." Her passivity legitimizes the bat-
terer's belief that he has the right to abuse her. Id.
28. L. WALKER, supra note 3, at 59.
29. Id. at 60. Although many women are seriously injured, they often wait days
before seeking medical treatment, if they decide to go at all. Id. at 63.
30. Id. at 62. Some women in Walker's initial study reported that occasionally they
provoked the incident. Walker explains that when this happens, the couple usually has
been in a period of prolonged battering, and the woman knows that the acute violence is
inevitable. Thus, the woman initiates what she considers an inevitable result because
she can no longer tolerate her terror or anxiety. Id. at 60.
31. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 44. Walker argues that there is
sound reasoning behind the battered woman's apparent passivity in the face* of severe
violence. Id. Many women reported that once they tried to resist, their batterer would
only become more violent. Id. See also L. WALKER, supra note 3, at 61-62.
32. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 44. The batterer begs for for-
giveness, and she convinces herself that he has truly changed. Id. at 45. See also L.
WALKER, supra note 3, at 65-70.
33. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 45. Specifically, women and their
batterers are extremely emotionally dependent upon one another. Walker explains that
during this phase, each partner may believe that death is preferable to separation.
Moreover, many women do not leave because they believe they are responsible for their
batterers' stability. The woman's assessment of her importance to the batterer is not
unreasonable. In one study, almost 10% of the batterers committed suicide after the
woman left. Id.
In order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the bat-
tering cycle at least twice. If a woman is abused a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is a battered woman. L. WALKER, supra note 3, at xv.
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ing in poverty. 4 Rather, battered women are found in all age
groups, races, income levels, and educational backgrounds.3 5 The
similarities are found in their values and attitudes. They usually
have a poor self-image and low self-esteem. 6 Battered women
often state that they feel at fault for not being able to stop their
batterer's behavior and blame themselves for their failing relation-
ship with the batterer.17 Unfortunately, guilt and shame often pre-
vent them from seeking outside help.3 8
Researchers have identified several characteristics common to
battered women who killed their abusers.3 9 First, those who killed
perceived their batterers as inflicting even greater levels of violence
than is typical in battering relationships.40 Their batterers were
more likely to use weapons, and consequently, these women suf-
fered serious injuries.4" In addition, these women generally re-
ceived more death threats.42 Most significant, those who killed
reported that they sincerely believed that their batterer was capable
of killing either her or himself.43
34. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 106.
35. D. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 19; L. WALKER, supra note 3, at 19. Most battered
women are from middle-class and upper-income backgrounds, and as a group, are less
likely to leave the battering relationship than are working-class or lower-income women.
Id. See also L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 107. One reason for this may
be that lower-income women have greater contacts with social services agencies and are
thus more apt to realize that help exists outside of their homes and immediate families.
Id.
36. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 102.
37. Id. at 102-03. The constant stress and anxiety that the battered woman under-
goes often leads to psychosomatic ailments and depression. Id. at 103.
38. Id. The combination of the batterer's extreme possessiveness and her fear of
exposing the truth about the abuse often causes the battered woman to remain isolated.
Id.
39. See A. BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KILL (1987). Browne compared the 40
homicide cases that she worked on and completed by 1983 with a subsample of 100
battered women who had been living outside of the battering relationship for less than a
year.
40. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 103-04.
41. Id.
42. Id. Common characteristics of batterers most likely to be killed are also identifi-
able. For instance, many of these men had sexually abused the battered woman or her
children. Some had extreme suicidal tendencies and would order the woman to kill
them. All of the battered women who killed described their batterers as unusually suspi-
cious and possessive. They often threatened to hurt or kill her relatives and friends. In
addition, these men had all threatened the women with guns, knives, or other weapons.
Id. at 104-05.
43. Id. at 105. Walker explains that "[b]attered women who kill have almost invaria-
bly done so after having experienced ... an uncontrollably savage acute incident," and
do so in order to keep one from happening again. Id. at 106. Many said that they did
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II. SELF-DEFENSE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME
The cases involving battered women on trial for killing their
batterers can be divided into two categories: traditional confronta-
tion cases, in which the battered woman kills while being physically
attacked; and non-traditional confrontation cases, in which she kills
either during a lull in an attack, or no attack at all is taking place.44
Most courts have allowed expert testimony in traditional confronta-
tion cases 45  but have excluded it in non-traditional cases. 46
Although it may be a partial success for the testimony to be admit-
ted in any battered woman's case,47 by permitting expert testimony
only in traditional confrontation cases, courts are allowing the testi-
mony where battered women least need it,4" and denying it to those
who need it most.49  The reasons for this phenomenon become
not intend to kill, but rather sensed that the level of violence had escalated so far out of
control that they sincerely believed that it would never diminish again. Id.
44. Some courts use this terminology. See People v. Minnis, 118 11. App. 3d 345,
347, 455 N.E.2d 209, 211 (1983) (suggesting that syndrome testimony should be admit-
ted when the defendant has killed her husband in a "non-confrontational situation, the
classic example being where a battered woman has killed her husband while he slept");
see also Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8
HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 121, 138-40 (1985).
45. See, e.g., Strong v. State, 251 Ga. 540, 307 S.E.2d 912 (1983) (battered woman
syndrome testimony was admitted where the defendant fatally stabbed her husband after
he knifed her).
46. See, e.g., Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (expert testi-
mony inadmissible where the defendant killed her husband after he pointed his finger at
her in a menacing way); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 519, 423 N.E.2d 137, 138
(1981) (testimony properly excluded where the defendant shot her husband during a
verbal argument).
47. Some commentators disagree, however, and argue that inappropriate use of the
testimony could encourage stereotyping. See Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women:
Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 646 (1980). The prob-
lem is not with defendants using the testimony where it does not accurately portray their
situation, thereby running the risk that the testimony might harm their case, but rather,
the problem is that courts misinterpret the testimony. See Crocker, supra note 44, at 132
n. 56 (citing WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 179-203 (E.
Bochnak ed. 1981)).
48. Arguably, battered women should not need the aid of expert testimony to sup-
port the reasonableness of their fear of imminent harm in classic self-defense situations.
See Crocker, supra note 44, at 142. In reality, however, women need evidence of past
abuse to counter the cultural assumption that they cannot reasonably assess the danger
presented by their batterers. Id. at 143. This same evidence can sometimes be turned
against them to cast doubt on the need for deadly force, because they did not act simi-
larly in past beatings. Id. Thus, the expert testimony is needed to put into perspective
the evidence of past abuse. The basis for this "twisted line of reasoning," is not very
complicated, but courts continually overlook it and confuse the issues. Id.
49. See infra notes 68-86 and accompanying text discussing cases involving non-con-
frontational situations.
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more clear after an examination of traditional self-defense theory
and how it has been applied to cases involving battered women.
A. Traditional Self-Defense
In Maryland, self-defense is a complete defense to homicide
only when the defendant acted under an honest and reasonable be-
lief that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
harm.5 ° In addition, the defendant cannot claim self-defense if he
was the aggressor or introduced unreasonable force.5' The stan-
dards of this traditional self-defense model often are difficult for the
battered woman to meet for several reasons. First, the traditional
rule of "reasonable force" assumes that equal force is matched
against equal force.5 2 Even though the modern trend is to take ac-
count of the parties' respective size and gender,"3 the woman's in-
troduction of a deadly weapon can still preclude her self-defense
claim.54 This is true despite the reality that most batterers are capa-
ble of killing their victims by kicking, punching, and choking. 5
Second, the battered woman's self-defense claim can fail be-
cause she killed during "a momentary lull," and thus the danger was
50. State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 485, 483 A.2d 759 (1984). This is the traditional
objective standard that most states require. Some states employ a purely subjective
standard where
[A] defendant's conduct is not to be judged by what a reasonably cautious per-
son might or might not do or consider necessary to do under like circum-
stances, but what he himself in good faith honestly believed and had reasonable
ground to believe was necessary for him to do to protect himself from... great
bodily injury.
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) (quoting State v. Hazlett, 16 N.D.
426, 113 N.W. 374 (1907)).
51. Faulkner, 301 Md. at 485. The court stated that the accused "must not have been
the aggressor or provoked the conflict; and ... [t]he force used must not have been
unreasonable." Id.
52. See W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, CRIMINAL LAw 454-63 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
LAFAVE & ScoTr]; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1113-16 (3d ed. 1982) [herein-
after R. PERKINS].
53. See LAFAVE & Sco-rr, supra note 52, at 457.
54. Id.
55. The common law view of nondeadly force presupposes two men of approxi-
mately equal size, weight, and strength, fighting each other. See R. PERKINS, supra note
52, at 457. Women are raised to be physically passive. They may perceive danger and
imminence differently than do men. See Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who
Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 149, 156
(1978) (discussing women's different perceptions of danger, provocation, and time re-
strictions); Crocker, supra note 44, at 126-28 (arguing that it is a white male's perception
of danger, immediacy, and harm, that forms the definition of reasonable physical re-
sponses for purposes of self-defense claims).
928 [VOL. 50:920
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not "imminent."56 The fundamental problem that some courts still
refuse to acknowledge is that many women simply are unable to de-
fend themselves during an attack.57 The temptation to automati-
cally decide that the woman was the aggressor in a situation in which
she seized the first opportunity to protect herself from deadly force
is understandable, given the reasonable-man definition of self-de-
fense. By so doing, however, courts run the risk of denying a bat-
tered woman the opportunity to prove the legitimacy of her fear and
the reasonableness of her actions, and thereby precluding her right
to a fair trial.5
B. The Role of Expert Testimony
Expert testimony is offered by defendants to help prevent
courts from automatically placing the battered woman outside the
definition of self-defense.59 Without expert testimony lending cred-
ibility to the woman's assertion that her perceptions of danger were
reasonable, it would be difficult for a jury to find that a battered
woman's conduct in non-confrontational cases was consistent with
56. The battered woman's failure to comply with the immediacy requirement in self-
defense can cause the court to determine that her assessment of the potential for danger
was unreasonable. See State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601, 603-04 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (the
defendant's fear of imminent danger was unreasonable if the argument ended several
minutes before the stabbing). See also L. WALKER, supra note 2, at 60 (noting that bat-
tering incidents can last for hours, and are not single isolated hits and punches). Simi-
larly, if there is a time lapse, courts frequently decide that the woman was the aggressor,
and consequently deny her self-defense instruction. See Commonwealth v. Grove, 363
Pa. Super. 328, 331-32, 526 A.2d 369, 371 (1987) (refusing to grant self-defense instruc-
tion where the defendant shot her sleeping husband).
57. See L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 44.
58. At least one court has determined that failure to use gender-specific instructions
may violate a female defendant's rights to equal protection. The Supreme Court of
Washington in State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240-41, 559 P.2d 548, 559 (1977) (en
banc) held:
The respondent was entitled to have the jury consider her actions in the
light of her own perceptions of the situation, including those perceptions which
were the product of our nation's 'long and unfortunate history of sex discrimi-
nation.' . . . Until such time as the effects of that history are eradicated, care
must be taken to assure that our self-defense instructions afford women the
right to have their conduct judged in light of the individual physical handicaps
which are the product of sex discrimination. To fail to do so is to deny the right
of the individual women involved to trial by the same rules which are applicable
to male defendants.
Id. (citation omitted).
59. See Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (ex-
plaining that the testimony is offered to assist a jury in assessing how the syndrome
relates to the defendant's claim of self-defense).
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the requirements of traditional self-defense.' If expert testimony is
admitted, however, the "leap" in legal reasoning is not as great as
one might expect. 6
Expert testimony works to discredit the assumption that the
battered woman who killed in non-confrontational situations must
have been the aggressor.6 2 Because the primary purpose of expert
testimony is to give the battered woman an opportunity to explain
how she reasonably perceived a danger that required self-defense, it
is intended to clarify how a battered woman can recognize a legiti-
mate threat of harm when others might not.63 The expert can show
60. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
61. Before any extensive research on battering relationships had been conducted,
many attorneys defending battered women who killed, resorted to insanity or dimin-
ished capacity defenses precisely because they could not make the case fit a self-defense
claim. Unfortunately, defenders of battered women still are trying to overcome the det-
rimental effect of such precedents, and courts continue to misperceive the battered wo-
man syndrome as an impaired mental state defense and thus find that her self-defense
claim must be based on excuse rather than justification. A recent example of this confu-
sion is illustrated in Judge Holmes' concurring judgment in State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d
213, 221, 551 N.E.2d 970, 977 (1990), in which he wrote separately to emphasize his
belief that the battered woman's self-defense plea is one of excuse. He stated that "ac-
quittal is dependant upon proving that defendant had . . . a disability that caused a
mistaken, but reasonable, belief in the existence of circumstances that would justify self-
defense." Id. This view, if accepted, automatically assumes that a battered woman's
perception of imminent harm could never be correct. This type of reasoning reinforces
false societal views that battered women must suffer from some type of disease of the
mind that causes them to lose all sense of rational thought, and conflicts with medical
research on the syndrome. Fortunately, most courts consider it well settled that expert
testimony is not offered to show that the battered woman suffered from a mental defect.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387, 389-90 (Ky. 1990) (the battered wo-
man syndrome is not a mental condition and is not presented to show mental impair-
ment); Hawthorne, 408 So. 2d at 806-07 (a defective mental state on the part of the
accused is not being offered as a defense; rather, the testimony applies to the specific
defense of self-defense, which requires a showing that the accused acted reasonably).
Moreover, perpetuation of the myth that the battered woman is somehow to blame
for her batterer's behavior would result if self-defense claims were presented as merely
excusable and not justifiable. Excusable acts carry the stigma of "blameworthiness."
The defendant is not punished for committing the act based on her state of mind, but is
punished because society determines that a net wrong or harm to society resulted from
the act. Conversely, justifiable acts are not punishable because society views the actor's
conduct as the proper and correct one, given the circumstances.
62. In the non-confrontational cases in which expert testimony has been admitted,
courts have found that the defendant was not the initial aggressor, and a self-defense
instruction was warranted. In each of the following cases, a self-defense instruction was
given despite the fact that the batterer was asleep when the defendant killed him: Peo-
ple v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1984); People v. Powell, 102 Misc. 2d
775, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1980), aff'd, 83 A.D.2d 719, 442 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1981); State v.
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
63. See Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of
Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 211-12 (1986). This author
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how battered women who experience patterns of cyclical abuse
learn to identify the early signs of impending physical violence, and
the severity of harm an oncoming attack is likely to bring.'
This testimony is crucial to the battered woman's credibility.65
When evidence such as threats, changes in tone of voice, and
promises of future violence, is considered outside the context of the
battering relationship, the average juror instinctively would assess
the approaching violence to be far removed from the legal definition
of "imminent harm."66
Thus, without expert testimony in non-confrontational cases, a
fully informed determination cannot be made of the "reasonable-
ness" of a battered woman's perception of imminent harm. This
usually occurs when the court first determines that the legal require-
describes the dilemma all battered women face after they have killed their batterers,
whether they killed in a confrontational situation or not. Schneider explains:
A battered woman who has been the victim of abuse for many years and
has survived it before, must credibly explain why it was necessary to act on that
occasion. Expert testimony . . . highlights a contradiction implicit in the
message of the battered woman's syndrome-if the battered woman was so
helpless and passive, why did she kill the batterer?
... [E]xpert testimony enable[s] the jury to find that the battered wife,
because of the prior beatings is particularly able to predict the extent of violence in
any attack against her .... This is a crucial point, indeed in most cases this is
the real importance of the testimony .... The reasonableness of the women's
fear and the reasonableness of her act are not issues which the jury knows as
well as anybody else. The jury needs expert testimony on reasonableness pre-
cisely because the jury may not understand that the battered woman's predic-
tion of the likely extent and imminence of violence is particularly acute and
accurate.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Numerous myths concerning battered women must be dispelled to bolster bat-
tered women's credibility, and to insure that they are not unfairly prejudiced at trial.
One important myth being that she is free to leave the relationship but freely chose to
remain. The average lay person may believe that a battered woman is masochistic, as
evidenced by her inability to leave. See State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 205-06, 478 A.2d 364,
377-78 (NJ. 1984) (expert testimony is needed because it is aimed at an area in which
the purported common knowledge of the jury may be very much mistaken, and may lead
to a wholly incorrect conclusion).
66. See Bochnak, Case Preparation and Development, in WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 44-45 (F. Bochnak ed. 1981). Bochnak states that:
[W]hen the defendant is a battered woman, the very intimacy of the relation-
ship explains the reasonableness of her perception of danger.
The battered woman learns to recognize the small signs that precede peri-
ods of escalated violence. She learns to distinguish subtle changes in tone of
voice, facial expression, and levels of danger. She is in a position to know,
perhaps with greater certainty than someone attacked by a stranger, that the
batterer's threat is real and will be acted upon.
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ments for self-defense are not met, and thus the issue of reasonable-
ness and, consequently, the issue of expert testimony, are never
reached. This is the battered woman's quandary. Courts demand
that she prove facts sufficient to raise the claim of self-defense
before expert testimony on the syndrome will be admitted. Yet, she
needs the expert testimony to prove that her perceptions were rea-
sonable in order to establish the imminence of the danger she faced.
It is in this manner that the proper use of expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome has been thwarted.67
A recent example of this is illustrated in State v. Stewart,68 in
which the Supreme Court of Kansas reiterated its view that expert
testimony on the syndrome is admissible in cases of self-defense,
but reversed as error the trial court's decision to grant the defend-
ant a self-defense instruction where no overt act by the aggressor
was shown.69 The defendant in Stewart was unquestionably the vic-
tim of her husband's repeated abuse. He once ordered the defend-
ant to kill and bury her own daughter.70 In the middle of the night
he roused her from sleep by beating her with a baseball bat.7 1 The
victim shot a family pet, and held a loaded gun to the defendant's
head and threatened to kill her.72 The defendant shot her husband
while he was asleep.73
The court first noted that traditional self-defense concepts may
not apply to victims of long-term abuse, such as battered spouses. 4
It further acknowledged that battered women may find it necessary
to defend themselves during a "momentary lull in the abuse" be-
cause of the prior history of abuse and the differences in size and
strength between the woman and her batterer. 75 It ultimately deter-
mined, however, that the facts of the case must still show that the
spouse was in imminent danger "close to the time of the killing. "76
By making this preliminary determination that the battered woman's
67. There is some indication that this trend might be changing. Some courts have
decided to permit the testimony in non-confrontational cases, rather than automatically
denying a self-defense instruction. See People v. Scott, 97 I1. App. 3d 899, 424 N.E.2d
70 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247,
719 P.2d 1268 (1986).
68. 243 Kan. 639, 763 P.2d 572 (1988).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 641, 763 P.2d at 574-75.
71. Id. at 642, 763 P.2d at 575.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 643, 763 P.2d at 575.
74. Id. at 645, 763 P.2d at 577.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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apprehension of imminent harm was unreasonable, the court effec-
tively precluded the jury from determining whether the "lull" in this
case was sufficient to remove her from imminent danger.
In contrast, the New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Gal-
legos,"' held that evidence of past incidents of violence "bears di-
rectly on the.., apparent immediacy of danger," and allowed a self-
defense instruction in a non-confrontational situation.78 The trial
court refused to instruct the jury on the issue of self-defense be-
cause the defendant failed to prove an obvious immediate threat.79
The victim repeatedly subjected the defendant to sexual and physi-
cal abuse.8 ° On numerous occasions, the victim held a loaded gun
to the defendant's head and threatened to shoot her if she ever left
him.8 ' While the defendant was pregnant, the victim threw her
against a wall, causing premature birth.8" On the day of the killing,
he struck their child in the face with a belt buckle, sexually abused
the defendant, and threatened to kill her.83 She shot him while he
was lying in bed.84 The trial court admitted testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome but refused to permit the use of the term
"battered wife syndrome '"85 or to grant a self-defense instruction."
The North Carolina intermediate appellate court in State v. Nor-
man 7 found a self-defense instruction warranted despite non-con-
frontation circumstances. 8  On the day of the killing, the
defendant's husband subjected her to continuous beatings, and
made repeated threats to either cut her throat, kill her, or cut off
one of her breasts.8 9 When he fell asleep that afternoon, the de-
fendant shot him.9 The North Carolina court reasoned that immi-
nent harm still existed because the husband's nap was "but a
momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror."'" Unfortu-
77. 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268 (1986).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 250, 719 P.2d at 1271.
80. Id. at 251, 719 P.2d at 1272.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 253, 719 P.2d at 1274.
86. Id. at 249, 719 P.2d at 1268.
87. 89 N.C. App. 384, 366 S.E.2d 586 (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 253, 378 So. 2d 8
(1989).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 387, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
90. Id. at 388, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
91. Id. at 394, 366 S.E.2d at 598. The court stated:
[Wlith the battered spouse there can be, under certain circumstances, an un-
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nately, this decision later was reversed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court.92
Despite the logic of the Gallegos decision, most courts adhere to
the reasoning set forth in Stewart, as the ultimate outcome of the
Norman case demonstrates. Consequently, establishing a self-de-
fense instruction continues to present the greatest hurdle for the
battered woman who killed at a time when she was not under direct
attack.
III. MARYLAND CASES
Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome should be
admissible in Maryland. The Court of Appeals has not ruled on the
issue, but two unreported Court of Special Appeals decisions dis-
cuss the possibility.93 Although both decisions affirmed the lower
courts' refusal to admit the testimony, neither case indicates that
Maryland courts would preclude evidence on the syndrome in cases
in which a battered woman has succeeded in generating a self-de-
fense instruction.
A. Kriscumas v. State
In Kriscumas v. State,94 the Court of Special Appeals upheld the
defendant's second degree murder conviction for the shooting
lawful killing of a passive victim that does not preclude the defense of self-
defense. Given the characteristics of battered spouse syndrome, we do not be-
lieve that a battered person must wait until a deadly attack occurs or that the
victim must in all cases be actually attacking or threatening to attack at the very
moment defendant commits the unlawful act for the person to act in self-de-
fense. Such a standard, in our view, would ignore the realities of the condition.
Id.
92. 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989). The North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
The relaxed requirements ... proposed by our Court of Appeals would tend to
categoricaly legalize the opportune killing of abusive husbands by their wives
solely on the basis of the wives' testimony concerning their subjective specula-
tion as to the probability of future felonious assaults by their husbands. Homi-
cidal self-help would then become a lawful solution, and perhaps the easiest
and most effective solution to this problem.... It has even been suggested that
the relaxed requirements of self-defense found in what is often called the "bat-
tered woman's defense" could be extended in principle to any type of case in
which a defendant testified that he or she subjectively believed that killing was
necessary and proportionate to any perceived threat.
Id. at 265-66, 378 S.E.2d at 15-16.
93. Kriscumas v. State, No. 86-1072 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 9, 1987); Friend v.
State, No. 88-483 (Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 12, 1988). Because the cases are unreported,
they are without precedential value. See MD. R. 8-114. Nevertheless, they provide in-
sight into how Maryland's courts might treat the issue in the future.
94. No. 86-1072 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 9, 1987).
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death of her husband.95 The court affirmed the trial judge's refusal
to instruct the jury on self-defense and imperfect self-defense. 96 Be-
cause the court agreed that the issue of imperfect self-defense was
not properly generated, it concluded that there was no need to ad-
dress the admissibility of evidence on the battered woman
syndrome.97
The defendant in Kriscumas offered evidence of numerous beat-
ings and death threats by the victim.98 For instance, "the victim
would load a gun, take a couple of bullets out, spin the barrel and
then point the gun at her and pull the hammer back."' 9 The de-
fendant testified that the day before the shooting, the victim had
beaten her because she refused to shoot him as he had instructed
her.' 00 He threatened to "waste" her if she refused to shoot him.'O'
The court reasoned that imperfect self-defense is warranted
only if the defendant produces evidence both negating her aggres-
sor status and proving that she honestly but unreasonably believed
force was necessary to prevent imminent harm. ' 0 2 The court deter-
mined that battered woman syndrome evidence only would go to
her subjective state of mind,'0 3 but that aggressor status must be
95. Id., slip op. at 24.
96. Id., slip op. at 20-21. Imperfect self-defense mitigates murder to manslaughter
when the defendant shows that he honestly held a subjective belief that he was in immi-
nent danger, even though the belief may be found to be objectively unreasonable. Sims
v. State, 319 Md. 540, 554, 573 A.2d 1317, 1323 (1990). The court in Watkins v. State,
79 Md. App. 136, 138, 555 A.2d 1087, 1089 (1989) explained:
Where... the defender unreasonably (though honestly) perceives the danger
or unreasonably (though honestly) responds with more than necessary force, it is a
case of imperfect self-defense, which mitigates the level of blameworthiness
down to the manslaughter level even though it does not totally exculpate.
Id. (emphasis in original).
97. Kriscumas, No. 68-1072, slip op. at 21.
98. Id. at 4-7.
99. Id. at 6.
100. Id. at 4-5.
101. Id. at 5. The defendant testified as to what would happen if she did not shoot
him as he told her to:
And he took, and he telling me how he wanted me to kill him, and I says,
no. I says, I love you. I said, I don't want to do that. And he hit me. He says,
you are mine. You are my possession. I don't care what you feel or not, he
says, you are going to do what I say. When I say it, he says. And if you don't,
he said, I am going to get tired of waiting and then I am going to waste you. He
says I will make your life miserable. He says, I will give you pain and cause you
pain until you do it.
Id.
102. Id. at 17-22.
103. Id. at 20.
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evaluated on an objective basis.' 0 4 Because it found that the de-
fendant clearly was the aggressor in this case, the court found no
cause to hear expert testimony on the syndrome.'0 5
B. Friend v. State
In Friend v. State,'0 6 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the defendant's conviction of murder in the second degree
for the shooting death of her husband.' 0 7 Because the trial judge
found that the defendant was the aggressor, she was not entitled to
invoke the doctrines of perfect or imperfect self-defense.'0 8
The defendant in Friend, a Baltimore City police officer, claimed
that expert testimony on the syndrome was relevant to both her sub-
jective and objective belief that her actions were necessary to pre-
vent her own death.' 0 9 She presented evidence of extreme physical
and psychological abuse. The victim told the defendant that he
would kill her if she ever left him. " 0 The defendant believed him,
and testified that she believed this on the morning of the killing
when she made the decision to leave."' There was conflicting evi-
dence about the events surrounding the killing. The defendant tes-
tified that the victim saw her with the gun, started yelling and came
right at her." 2 When she saw him coming, she fired the gun.'"
The State offered evidence that the victim was shot lying down in
bed with a sheet over him." 4 The court agreed that evidence on the
syndrome was properly excluded because once evidence proves ag-
gressor status, the honesty and the reasonableness of the defend-
ant's belief that her actions were necessary to defend herself are
utterly immaterial." 5
104. Id. at 20.
105. Id. at 21.
106. No. 88-483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 12, 1988).
107. Id., slip op. at 1.
108. Id., slip op. at 10. The court stated "when the evidence shows that the accused
was the aggressor, both the honesty and the reasonableness of his belief that his actions
were necessary to defend himself are utterly immaterial." Id.
109. Id. at 9-10.
110. Id. at 7-8.
111. Id. at 8.
112. Id. at4.
113. Id. at8.
114. Id. at 2. The State's evidence consisted of a ballistics expert who testified that
the victim was shot lying down. Id.
115. Id. at 10.
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C. Analysis
A close reading shows that neither case suggests that expert tes-
timony should be excluded if offered to bolster a self-defense claim.
Specifically, Friend merely reaffirms the proposition established in
Kriscumas that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is
inadmissible if the defense of self-defense is itself unavailable be-
cause of the defendant's aggressor status. Thus, there is no direct
indication in either case that expert testimony concerning the bat-
tered woman syndrome would not be relevant to a self-defense plea.
What is troubling about these cases, however, is the fact that the
courts failed to see that expert testimony factors into the analysis of
whether the woman's actions were objectively reasonable, not
merely subjectively honest, and thus the testimony is directly rele-
vant to her aggressor status."16 By making the preliminary judg-
ment as to the woman's aggressor status before expert testimony is
allowed, the court has placed the battered woman in an impossible
position. If circumstances vary from a direct confrontational situa-
tion, a battered woman's fear, possibly reasonable and legitimate,
may never be properly assessed.
These cases also reveal another cause for concern. Misinforma-
tion regarding spousal abuse and the true purpose of expert testi-
mony on the subject underlies both opinions. Courts in other states
consider it well settled that one reason expert testimony on the syn-
drome is necessary in these cases is for the purpose of dispelling the
false notion that evidence of the battered woman's attempts at fight-
ing back in the past indicate that she is not the passive battered wo-
man she claims to be." 7 Maryland courts, however, continue to
116. The court in Kriscumas distinguished the facts there from non-confrontational
cases in other jurisdictions in which the testimony was allowed by reasoning that there
"was at least conflicting [evidence] on the aggressor question," Kriscumas v. State, No.
86-1072, slip op. at 19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 9, 1987), but this issue was not discussed
in Friend, despite conflicting evidence regarding the aggressor question. Moreover, the
court in Kriscumas insisted that the inference that the victim was the aggressor could not
be drawn simply from evidence of her subjective honest belief that, because of past
abuse and threats, she was in imminent harm, and reasonably, from the standpoint of a
battered spouse, perceived the victim to be the aggressor. Id. at 16. This is, however,
exactly what courts in other jurisdictions have held. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 97 Ill. App.
3d 899, 424 N.E.2d 70 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Gal-
legos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268 (1986).
117. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41, 64, 555 A.2d 772, 784
(1989). The court explained:
An additional myth was advanced by the prosecutor, i.e., that appellant used
weapons to defend herself and having used weapons did not conform to the
stereotype of battered women who suffer their beatings passively. Although
there are battered women who do not defend themselves and die as a result of
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believe that evidence that shows the defendant attempted to defend
herself on past occasions is probative evidence establishing that the
battered woman "while clearly a victim of abuse, was not as totally
passive as [she] sought to establish." '
Except for these two unreported cases, no Maryland appellate
court has ruled on the admissibility of expert testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome in cases of self-defense, and therefore, de-
fense counsel must be prepared with persuasive arguments to gain
its admission. The new legislation alleviates some of the more obvi-
ous hurdles defendants might expect to encounter in their effort to
introduce the testimony,1 9 but examination of Maryland law con-
cerning admissibility of expert testimony reveals that the statute
does not really add anything to existing law. Where self-defense is
properly raised, under Maryland's well-settled evidentiary rules, ex-
pert testimony on the syndrome should not be denied admission,
regardless of the new statute.
D. Admissibility of Expert Testimony
The admissibility of expert testimony is an area in which the
trial court is given broad discretion, and it rarely constitutes a basis
for reversal.' 20 In Maryland, the standard for admissibility of expert
testimony is whether the finder of fact can receive "appreciable
help" from an expert on the subject matter. 2 ' The expert's opin-
ion, even on the ultimate issue, is admissible if it is relevant and will
aid the trier of fact.' 22 The particular subject also must be generally
their injuries, the fact that a woman attempts to defend herself from a beating
does not make her any less a battered woman in that her attempts do not stop
the repeated episodes of physical and emotional abuse.
Id. at 64 n.10, 555 A.2d at 784 n.10.
118. Friend, No. 88-483, slip op. at 12.
119. Because of the new law's requirements, a court will be unable to refuse the testi-
mony on the grounds that the syndrome is not generally recognized in the medical com-
munity, that it will not appreciably help the jury, or that it will usurp the jury's function.
See supra note 9.
120. See State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 101, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (1986) (upholding
admission of post traumatic stress disorder evidence through expert testimony).
121. See, e.g., Cider Barrel Mobile Home Court v. Eader, 287 Md. 571, 584, 414 A.2d
1246, 1254 (1980).
122. Id. The expert testimony will be relevant to explain why a woman who exhibits
characteristics common to the battered woman syndrome would believe herself in immi-
nent danger at the time of the killing. See, e.g., State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me.
1981) (the testimonial evidence is highly probative and is likely to prove that her con-
duct was consistent with the theory of self-defense); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591,
597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984) (the testimony was relevant and would have substantial
bearing on her perceptions at the time of the killing).
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accepted in the relevant scientific community, 23 and the expert
must be properly qualified.'
24
Some courts employ an even stricter standard than Maryland's
"appreciable help" requirement and demand that the testimony
concern matters beyond the jury's understanding. 12 5 Many of these
courts have concluded that testimony on the syndrome satisfies this
"beyond-the-ken" test, and should be admitted because it can cor-
rect common misconceptions and prejudices concerning battered
women.' 2 6 Given Maryland's more lenient standard, and the major-
ity consensus among other jurisdictions and experts that extremely
abusive relationships are beyond the average layman's comprehen-
sion, the "appreciable help" requirement should not preclude
admissibility.
Moreover, even absent the statute, syndrome testimony should
not be denied admission on the grounds that the relevant scientific
community has failed to accept it. According to the majority of the
cases, the battered woman syndrome has a sufficient scientific basis
to produce uniformly reasonable results, and has developed enough
general acceptance to warrant admissibility.' 27 For instance, as a
New York court in People v. Torres stated:' 28
[T]he theory underlying the battered woman's syndrome
has indeed passed beyond the experimental stage and
gained a substantial enough scientific acceptance to war-
123. In Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978), the Court of Appeals
adopted the standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923),
which required that "before a scientific opinion will be received as evidence at trial, the
basis of that opinion must be shown to be generally accepted as reliable within the ex-
pert's particular scientific field." 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368.
124. Mayor of Baltimore v. Smulyan, 41 Md. App. 202, 222, 397 A.2d 198, 209, cert.
denied, 285 Md. 728 (1979). The witness' knowledge of the subject must be significantly
better than the average lay person's, so that his training will be of appreciable help to
thejury. The trial judge exercises discretion in determining whether the expert is prop-
erly qualified, but once the evidence is admitted, its weight is for the finder of fact to
determine. Id
125. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (jurors
would not understand why the defendant stayed in the relationship unless they heard
expert testimony), rev. den., 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1982); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612,
619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981) (the behavior of battered women is beyond the ken of
jurors); Allety, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 316 (understanding battered woman
syndrome is not within the competence of an ordinary person).
126. See supra note 125.
127. See, e.g., People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 135, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1985) (the testimony had gained acceptance substantial enough to admit it);
State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990) (holding that the battered
woman syndrome has gained substantial scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility).
128. 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1985).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
rant admissibility. . . . [Niumerous articles and books have
been published about the .. .syndrome; and recent find-
ings of researchers in the field have confirmed its presence
and thereby indicated that the scientific community accepts
its underlying premises.' 2
9
Provided that the testimony on the syndrome comes from a quali-
fied expert, it should be admissible in Maryland courts.
Indeed, the analysis under the admissibility standard is straight-
forward, and no immediate basis for refusal is apparent. °3 0 Evalua-
tion of the literature on the syndrome and of the cases that have
admitted evidence on the issue should convince Maryland courts
that the battered woman syndrome is beyond the average layman's
understanding, and that the theory of the syndrome is both well-
researched and well-recognized in the relevant scientific community.
Nevertheless, because Maryland courts were slow to accept evidence
on the battered woman syndrome, the legislature determined that it
was necessary to take action.
IV. LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL OF THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME
A. Legislative Action in Missouri and Ohio
In addition to Maryland, Missouri and Ohio have passed laws
addressing the issue. In an effort to eliminate the inconsistency
among trial courts, Missouri became the first state to enact legisla-
tion regarding testimony on the battered woman syndrome.' 3 '
Passed in 1987, the Missouri law simply provides that "evidence the
actor was suffering from the battered spouse syndrome shall be ad-
missible upon the issue of whether the actor lawfully acted in self-
defense or defense of another."'312 The statute thus requires that
self-defense be an issue in the case before testimony on the syn-
drome will be admitted. Once the issue of self-defense is properly
generated, the testimony assists the battered woman in demonstrat-
ing the reasonableness of her actions. Two years later, the Ohio
legislature followed Missouri's initiative and enacted a law specifi-
129. Id. at 135, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
130. In State v. Allewat, 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1988), the Court of Appeals
admitted expert testimony on post traumatic stress disorder. See also L. WALKER, TERRI-
FYING LovE, supra note 16, at 48, 178-80 (experts have officially recognized battered
woman syndrome as a subcategory of post traumatic stress disorder).
131. See Comment, Missouri's New Law on "Battered Spouse Syndrome": A Moral Victory, A
Partial Solution, 33 ST. Louis L. REV. 227, 228 (1988) (the law's purpose is to remedy
inconsistent judicial treatment of syndrome testimony).
132. Mo. REV. STAT. § 563,033 (Supp. 1988).
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cally authorizing that expert testimony be admitted to assist the trier
of fact in determining whether the defendant acted in self-defense
where evidence establishes that she is a battered woman.13 3
Although these statutes do not answer all of the questions or
solve all of the problems surrounding the issue of admitting this tes-
timony, both correctly acknowledge the unique problems battered
women have in sustaining their claims of self-defense.13 4 Neverthe-
less, because the legislation makes no provision for cases that do not
meet the traditional requirements for self-defense, there is the dan-
ger that the laws will be of no help to the battered woman who kills
in non-confrontational circumstances. Each statute appears facially
to require that self-defense must be established before expert testi-
mony on the syndrome can be admitted. Consequently, a court log-
ically could construe these statutes as mandating that only battered
women who fight back when they are under direct attack have the
right to offer expert testimony on the syndrome.
Recent decisions from both jurisdictions, however, indicate that
the legislation indeed has helped battered women receive self-de-
fense instructions in non-classic cases of self-defense. In State v.
Koss, ' the Supreme Court of Ohio noted the legislation and al-
lowed expert testimony on the syndrome.' The defendant in Koss
testified that on several occasions her husband beat or threatened to
kill her. '3 7 The defendant testified that, on the night she killed him,
when she arrived home her husband was in bed, but as she un-
dressed, he "hauled off" and hit her.'3 8 She noticed his gun, which
had never been left out, and picked it up and shot him.'3 9 The court
admitted the testimony in order to aid the trier of fact in determin-
133. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Baldwin 1989). The statute provides in perti-
nent part:
(B) If a person is charged with an offense involving the use of force against
another, and the person, as a defense to the offense charged, raises the affirma-
tive defense of self-defense, the person may introduce expert testimony of the
'Battered Wife Syndrome'. . . as evidence to establish the requisite belief of an
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm ....
Id.
134. Indeed, at the very least, the statutes insure that the trial court will not refuse the
testimony on the basis of a lack of scientific acceptance in the general field, or that it is
not a subject beyond the ken of the average juror.
135. 49 Ohio St. 3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990).
136. Id. at 217 & n.2, 551 N.E.2d at 974 & n.2. Accordingly, the court overruled State
v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) to the extent that it held inadmis-
sible expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.
137. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d at 213, 551 N.E.2d at 971.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 214, 551 N.E.2d at 971.
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ing whether she acted in self-defense.14
In State v. Williams, 4 ' the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's decision denying the defendant a self-defense claim
and thereby excluding expert testimony on the syndrome.' 42 In
Williams, the defendant suffered numerous beatings and often had to
seek medical help. 143 On the evening of the killing, the defendant
had gone to pick up her house keys from her boyfriend who was
with an acquaintance named Robinson. 44 An argument ensued on
the front steps of Robinson's house between the defendant and her
boyfriend. 45 Her boyfriend knocked the defendant down the steps,
then struck her while she was on the ground. 4  The defendant's
glasses were knocked off, and she had them in her hand when she
started her car to leave.147 She saw her boyfriend approach the car,
but unbeknownst to her, Robinson had entered the street, and she
hit him when she side-swiped another car.' 48 She saw Robinson
climb to his knees, and thinking that he was her boyfriend, she
turned around, came back and ran over him.' 49
The court determined that if evidence of the syndrome is to
have meaning under the new Missouri legislation, it must be that if
the syndrome creates a perception in the battered woman so that, as
to her, the required elements have been met, then the issue of self-
defense should go to the jury. 5 ° The court further reasoned that a
self-defense instruction should not automatically be denied under
these facts and circumstances, because the self-defense issue would
be a question for the jury once it had before it evidence of the bat-
tered woman syndrome. 5 '
B. Legislative Action in Maryland
Maryland's newly enacted legislation differs from the Missouri
and Ohio laws in several important respects. First, the statute states
that the trial judge "may" admit expert testimony.' 52 The Missouri
140. Id. at 218, 551 N.E.2d at 975.
141. 787 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
142. Id. at 308.
143. Id. at 309.
144. Id. at 310.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 312.
151. Id. at 313.
152. See supra note 9.
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statute, by contrast, dictates that courts "shall" admit the testi-
mony.1 53 Thus, by taking the decision whether to admit the testi-
mony on the syndrome away from the trial judge's discretion, the
Missouri law will ensure greater uniformity. Conversely, because of
the Maryland law's permissive language, Maryland trial judges still
may refuse to allow the testimony, notwithstanding evidence tend-
ing to show a valid self-defense plea.' 54
Clearly, the most important aspect of the Maryland legislation
is the provision allowing expert testimony on the syndrome despite
evidence tending to show that the defendant was "the aggressor,
used excessive force, or failed to retreat at the alleged time of the
offense."' 55 Because expert testimony can be admitted despite evi-
dence tending to show that the defendant acted in a manner not in
accordance with traditional self-defense, the legislation provides a
way to circumvent the quandary into which the law has placed bat-
tered women. '
56
The statute's greatest shortcoming is its failure to require trial
courts to admit the testimony.' 57 An instruction that courts must
state with particularity the reasons for excluding such evidence
would add strength to the statute, although the matter ultimately
would continue to rest in the trial court's discretion. Regardless of
its weakness and the extent to which it merely restates existing evi-
dentiary rules, the statute will serve to influence judicial decisions
on the issue, and help to provide a fair trial to all defendants seeking
to introduce the testimony.158
153. Mo. REV. STAT. § 563,033 (Supp. 1988).
154. Under the statute, the testimony can be admitted only for the purpose of ex-
plaining the defendant's state of mind. See supra note 9. Clearly, evidence merely di-
rected to her state of mind cannot negate a trial judge's finding, as a matter of law, that
she was the aggressor. Thus, the legislation's effectiveness could prove even weaker
than originally thought. This is precisely why Maryland courts should look to other
jurisdictions where courts have not rejected a battered woman's claim of self-defense
based on the issue of aggressor status. See People v. Scott, 97 Ill. App. 3d 899, 424
N.E.2d 70 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M.
247, 719 P.2d 1268 (1986). A proper understanding of the battered woman syndrome
and of the "typical" battering relationship, reveals that, in a real sense, the batterer is
the only true "aggressor." Whether the batterer is actively threatening his victim at a
specific moment does not automatically negate the possibility that his victim is reason-
ably in fear of great bodily harm.
155. See supra note 9.
156. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text. Arguably, had this legislation been
available for the defendants in Friend and Kriscumas, each woman would have been al-
lowed to more fully present her self-defense arguments.
157. See supra note 9.
158. There is no question that this legislation is available to all defendants who show
some evidence that they display characteristics of the battered woman syndrome. The
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CONCLUSION
Absent a clear confrontational situation, it is evident that the
greatest hurdle a battered woman must overcome in her effort to
introduce expert testimony on the syndrome will be to establish her
claim of self-defense by showing that she was not the "aggressor."
While some courts have shown willingness to allow the testimony in
non-classic cases of self-defense, many jurisdictions adhere to a
legal construct of self-defense that simply cannot accommodate the
battered woman who, for whatever reason, kills at a moment when
she is not under attack. Although statutory remedies may be helpful
on the issue, Maryland courts need not rely solely on the legisla-
tion.159 Admission of testimony on the syndrome has not caused
"an open killing season on men."'' 60 It has, however, allowed bat-
tered women to receive their constitutional right to a fair trial.
JEANNE-MARIE BATES
legislation's gender-neutral language should make it clear that equal protection ques-
tions are not an issue. As written, the statute is available to men and women. Although
there is no relevant case law, arguably, syndrome testimony should also apply to homo-
sexual couples. Moreover, because the terms "spouse" and "cohabitant" are each in-
cluded in the statute, the statute's use should not be barred on the basis of marital
status. The law clearly is intended to apply to boyfriends and live-in companions, as well
as to former cohabitants and spouses.
159. Given the standards for admissibility of expert testimony, the testimony should
come in if a battered woman has killed during a confrontational situation. The legisla-
tion's contribution to the law would of course occur only in cases in which the defendant
killed during a momentary lull. If the recent Ohio and Missouri cases are any indication
of how a Maryland court would respond to similar legislation, the failure to include
language mandating admissibility will not prove troublesome. Nevertheless, if the stat-
ute's purpose is designed to admit expert testimony for the purpose of raising a sufficient
self-defense claim, then the language should clearly reflect that purpose. Until such
legislation is passed, Maryland courts should adopt the persuasive reasoning presented
in cases from other jurisdictions, and acknowledge the central role the testimony plays
in a battered woman's claim of self-defense.
160. Reference to statements made by prosecutor Ron Johnson during the first trial of
Joyce Hawthorne in which Dr. Walker's testimony was refused. This decision later was
overruled and the syndrome testimony admitted. See Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d
801, 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), rev. denied, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1982). In reference
to Dr. Walker's testimony, Mr. Johnson stated to the court:
If you let her testify, Judge, then she takes away the role of the jury to decide if
Joyce Hawthorne's perceptions of danger were reasonable. You'll open the
door to allow any woman to kill a man she doesn't like and get away with it! ...
She is a noted feminist, she admits to it right here on page 15 of the introduc-
tion to her book THE BATERED WOMAN, So we all know she's biased against
men. This woman would have decent people justify the actions of any woman
who kills a man, just because he tells her to obey him. It will be an open season
on killing men, your Honor, and you mustn't allow it!
L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 16, at 33.
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